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STATUTORY VAGUENESS IN JUVENILE LAW: THE
SUPREME COURT AND MATTIELLO v. CONNECTICUT
The Supreme Court in the landmark case of In re Gault' made a
major contribution toward revolutionizing state juvenile court systems.
The primary issue resolved in that case was the validity of denying juve-
nile defendants procedural rights guaranteed to adults in criminal pro-
ceedings. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Fortas clearly established
that such denial is unconstitutional.
The basis for the long line of precedents allowing juvenile courts
carte blanche to disregard procedural guarantees 2 was the theory that
courts were acting in loco parentis, that they were not punishing of-
fenders, but were merely sending delinquents to rehabilitative institu-
tions.3 Armed with this reasoning state courts time and again threw
up the shield of parens patriae 4 to fend off allegations that juvenile
defendants were denied constitutional rights.
Mr. Justice Fortas responded to this argument with a thorough
analysis that destroyed the myth of the rehabilitative nature of juvenile
1387 U.S. 1 (1967).
1 Some of the cases and the rights they have found unavailable are: Cinque v.
Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923) (constitutional rights generally); Childress v.
State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643 (1915) (grand jury) ; In re Mont., 175 Pa. Super.
150, 155-56, 103 A.2d 460, 463 (1954) (speedy public trial) ; Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257
Ill. 328, 100 N.E. 892, 895 (1913) (jury trial); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177,
183 N.E. 353, 354 (1932) (self-incrimination) ; In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183
P.2d 282 (1947) (self-incrimination); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523
(1954) (right to confront witnesses) ; People ex rel. Weber v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App.
2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955) (right to counsel) ; In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d
73, 242 P2d 362 (1952) (bail); People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262
P2d 656 (1953) (double jeopardy).
3 Professor Tappan succinctly describes this phenomenon:
By a convenient but highly misleading sophistry, [juvenile courts]
maintained that the child is not charged with a "crime," "convicted" as a
"criminal," nor "sentenced to a punishment." Rather, he is merely "adjudi-
cated" under a "petition" as a "delinquent," studied to determine how he may
be "saved," and then "treated" in his own best interest.
Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEB. L. REv. 547, 548-49 (1950).
A noteworthy exception among pre-Gault opinions is In re Contreras, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 787, 241 P2d 631 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be a
ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, neverthe-
less, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge
to credulity and doing violence to reason.
Id. at 789, 241 P2d at 633.
4 With regard to the notion of parens patriae, Mr. Justice Fortas said in Gault:
The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its
meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance.
387 U.S. at 16 (1967).
For a brief discussion of the history and theory of the juvenile court movement,
see Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR
THE CHII.D 22 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962) ; Welch-Delinquency Proceedings-
Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forun 50 MINN. L. REv.
653 (1966).
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reformatory institutions and exposed the harsh realities of the juvenile
courts.' He described the institutions to which the youthful offenders
were sent for supposed rehabilitative care:
It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical
meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is
called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that,
however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "in-
dustrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement
in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.
His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regi-
mented routine and institutional hours . . . ." Instead of
mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and
classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything
from waywardness to rape and homicide.'
He concluded that the distinction between a "penal" and a "rehabilita-
tive" or "nonpenal" hearing was not viable since the institution to which
the juvenile was committed in the nonpenal hearing was too much like
the jail of the convicted defendant. Eminent authorities agree with this
pessimistic evaluation.7
Justice Fortas also expressed the Court's concern for the severe
social consequences following a determination of delinquency-conse-
quences almost as harsh as those attending criminal conviction. He
commented that
[t]his claim of secrecy . . . [of detention hearings] is more
rhetoric than reality. Disclosure of court records is discre-
tionary with the judge in most jurisdictions. Statutory re-
strictions almost invariably apply only to the court records,
and even as to those the evidence is that many courts routinely
5See also P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 196 (1949); Antieau, Constitu-
tional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRm.u L.Q. 387 (1961) ; Ketcham, The Unful-
filled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, supra note 4; THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH, CRIME 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCE REPORT]. Referring to the unrealized protective and rehabilitative philoso-
phy of the juvenile court, Professor Tappan notes that "the slightest inspection of the
characteristic methodology and personnel of the children's court, the detention facility,
or the training school, should disillusion any one but the most ingenuous about these
euphemisms." Tappan, Unoflcial Delinquency, supra note 3, at 549.
0 387 U.S. at 27 (footnotes omitted).
7See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, .supra note 5, at 387-93.
Although any generalization concerning the overall effectiveness of state reform
institutions is difficult, the President's task force on juvenile delinquency made this
assessment of institutionalization as a dispositional alternative: "Institutionalization
too often means storage--isolation from the outside world-in an overcrowded, under-
staffed, high-security institution with little education, little vocational training, little
counseling or job placement or other guidance upon release. Programs are subordi-
nated to everyday control and maintenance." TASK FORCE REPORT 8.
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furnish information to the FBI and the military, and on re-
quest to government agencies and even to private employers.
Of more importance are police records. In most States the
police keep a complete file of juvenile "police contacts" and
have complete discretion as to disclosure of juvenile records.
Police departments receive requests for information from the
FBI and other law-enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces,
and social service agencies, and most of them generally com-
ply. Private employers word their application forms to pro-
duce information concerning juvenile arrests and court pro-
ceedings, and in some jurisdictions information concerning
juvenile police contact is furnished private employers as well
as government agencies.8
Thus, after lengthy analysis of certain constitutional rights guar-
anteed to individuals and their importance to the juvenile defendant,9
the Court held that due process required that they be available in juve-
nile court systems. As Mr. Justice Fortas stated in Kent v. United
States, without this protection "the child receives the worst of both
worlds: . . . he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitious care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 'o
Mattiello v. Connecticut " presented an excellent opportunity for
the Court to extend the logic of the Gault opinion.' Frances Mattiello,
8387 U.S. at 24-25 (footnotes omitted). See also Ketcham, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the American Juvenile Court, stpra note 4, at 22.
9387 U.S. at 31-57. The Gault decision required that juvenile courts give ade-
quate notice of scheduled court proceedings, appoint counsel to represent juvenile
defendants, and recognize the right of such defendants to confront their accusers,
cross-examine witnesses and invoke their constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. The Court did not rule on the asserted rights to appellate review of juvenile
court decisions and to a transcript at state expense. Id.
10383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (footnote omitted).
114 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A2d 507 (App. Div. 1966), cert. denied, 154 Conn. 737,
225 A.2d 201 (1966), prob. juris, noted, 391 U.S. 963 (1968), petition for cert. dis-
issed, 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
12 Some critics may argue that the Court really never intended that the Gault
opinion be extended. It is true that Justice Fortas attempted at one point in the
opinion to limit the meaning of the case:
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constiutional provi-
sions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We
do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile delinquents. For
example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional
rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we
direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process. See
note 48, infra. We consider only the problems presented to us by this case.
387 U.S. at 13. However, the sentence following the above limitation has direct
bearing on the issue here: "These relate to the proceedings by which a determination
is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged misconduct
on his part." Id. Since vague statutes go directly to the point of what is or is not
proscribed conduct, and since vague statutes directly affect the determination of
whether the youth is in fact "delinquent," it would appear that the matter discussed
in this comment certainly does fall within the bounds of Gault. Furthermore, it is
apparent that Justice Fortas was really concerned that the holding did not over-
formalize the juvenile process so that it would be impossible for authorities to dispose
1969]
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an unmarried girl of seventeen, was arrested on March 17, 1966, and
charged with being "in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice,"
a violation of a Connecticut statute. 3 On April 15, Miss Mattiello's
attorney, a court appointed public defender, filed a demurrer to the
charge, claiming the terms "habits of vice" and "vicious life" were so
vague and uncertain that the state statute on its face violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The Connecticut circuit
court overruled the demurrer and, following a hearing, sentenced the
defendant to the Connecticut State Farm for Women until she reached
the age of twenty-one.'" The appellate division of the circuit court
affirmed, relying on the argument rejected by the Supreme Court in
Gault: that is, that the proceedings were civil in nature, that the purpose
of the statute was protective rather than punitive,'6 and that the due
process clause was therefore inapplicable.1 7  The Connecticut Supreme
of some problems in a more expeditious manner. This theory is supported by Fortas's
cross-cite to footnote 48 of the opinion where he discusses matters such as preliminary
conferences which can be used by juvenile court judges to dispose of cases short of
adjudication. Id. at 31 n.48.
13 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-379 (1960). The full text reads:
Any unmarried female between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who
is in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice, or who is leading a vicious
life, or who has committed any crime, may, upon the complaint of the prose-
cuting attorney of the circuit court, be brought before said court for the
circuit within whose jurisdiction she resides or is found, and, upon conviction
thereof, may be committed, until she has arrived at the age of twenty-one
years, to the custody of any institution, except Long Lane School, chartered
by the general assembly or incorporated under the general laws for the
purpose of receiving and caring for females who have fallen into or are in
danger of falling into vicious habits.
'4 Brief for Appellant at 5, Mattiello v. Connecticut, 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
15 Id.
Miss Mattiello was also charged with violations of CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§53-219 (1960) (forbidding walking with a lascivious carriage), and CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53-175 (1960) (disorderly conduct). She was acquitted of the disorderly
conduct charge but found guilty of lascivious carriage. Her appeal, however, was
based solely on the conviction under CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-379 (1960).
It should also be noted that juveniles are often incarcerated by juvenile courts for
longer sentences than can be meted out to adults for the identical misdeed. For
example, if Frances Mattiello was convicted of soliciting for purposes of prostitution
she would serve a maximum 30 day jail sentence or pay a $50 fine, but a girl of 16
convicted of "being in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice" can be committed
for 5 years, or until she reaches age 21. Compare CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-235
(1958) with id. § 17-379 (1960).
16 State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507, 511 (App. Div. 1966).
Div. 1966).
171d. at 62, 225 A2d at 511. Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the court's
decision that juvenile detention statutes are nonpenal, the court's assertion that the
void-for-vagueness rule applies only to penal statutes is unwarranted. For example,
in A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925) the Supreme
Court applied constitutional standards of specificity in a civil contract dispute. The
Court noted:
The ground or principle of the [vagueness] decisions was not such as to be
applicable only to criminal prosecutions. It was not the criminal penalty
that was held invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard
which was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.
Id. at 239.
Referring to the applicability of a void-for-vagueness rule to noncriminal pro-
ceedings, one writer has noted that the seriousness of the penalty imposed by the
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Court denied Miss Mattiello's petition for certification in December,
1966.1"
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in
June, 1968.?9 However, in an unexpecetd move, the Court, after hearing
argument, dismissed the petition for want of a properly presented fed-
eral question." It is the contention of this Comment that the Mattiello
case presents a situation to which the logic of Gault is so patently ap-
plicable that dismissal of the case by the Supreme Court was an un-
acceptable response to pressing problems that threatens to undermine the
advancements of Gault itself.2
It is clear that if used as the basis for an adult criminal prosecution,
the Connecticut statute would be unconstitutionally vague. In Musser
v. Utah 2 the Supreme Court concisely summarized reasons for requir-
ing precise statutory definition. In Musser the Court vacated the
petitioner's conviction for "conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public
morals," ' because the Utah statute failed to "give adequate guidance
to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature
of the offense with which they were charged, or to guide courts in trying
those who are accused." 25 These same criticisms can be leveled at the
Connecticut delinquency statute. The statute affords neither child nor
parents a clear statement of proscribed conduct and fails to provide
statute has been an extremely important factor in determining whether a statute will
survive attack on vagueness grounds. Amsterdam, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine
In the Suprenme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 67, 69-70 n.16 (1960). If statutes imposing
severe penalties demand more stringent standards of specificity than statutes having
less drastic effect, the fact that Connecticut's "manifest danger" statute provides for
commitment from age 16 until age 21 warrants strict application of the vagueness
test. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (statute permitting jury
to assign prosecution costs to acquitted defendant if it found him guilty of "some
misconduct" did not pass vagueness test); Jordon v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231
(1951) (test applied to statute permitting deportation upon conviction of a "crime
involving moral turpitude").
18 154 Conn. 737, 225 A2d 201 (1966).
19 391 U.S. 963 (1968).
20 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
21 This contention is made in spite of the fact that it is never easy to explore the
reasons which underlie the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a given case.
Admittedly, the only certain reason which may be given is that fewer than four of the
Justices saw fit to review the decision of the lower court as a matter of "sound
judicial discretion." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912,
917-19 (1950). Nevertheless the dismissal of Mattiello could support those who
might wish to resist the advances of Gault.
22 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
23 For another concise discussion of vagueness, see Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), where the Supreme Court recognized requirements of
statutory definiteness basic to all statutes proscribing certain conduct:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant
alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
24333 U.S. at 97.
2 5Id.
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courts with a fixed standard by which to measure conduct. If a child
is not "informed as to what the State commands and forbids," 20 notice
by way of court proceedings is obviously too late to change the conduct.
Juveniles and their parents need, and are entitled to, advance notice
of the specific conduct which may result in the state exercising its
powers of parens patriae and perhaps committing the juvenile to an
institution.
In addition to the problems of prior notice, blatant injustices are
invited at the trial. If the statute under which a juvenile is charged is
so uncertain and all-encompassing that the state need prove no specific
crime or course of harmful conduct, defense counsel has little idea of
what he must defend against, and thus minimal opportunity to be ef-
fective." Second, the judiciary and the police must be given adequate
guidelines to determine whether conduct has been proscribed by the
state. Provisions such as those found in the Connecticut statute encour-
age the courts and the police to evaluate conduct on the basis of personal
morality and subjective considerations, rather than by reasoned appli-
cation of objective rules.2" The President's task force on juvenile de-
linquency found that such vague and all-encompassing statutes, especially
when administered with the informality characteristic of juvenile courts,
"establish the judge as arbiter not only of the behavior, but also of the
morals of every child (and to a certain extent the parents of every child)
appearing before him." 2 Furthermore, statutory uncertainty, com-
bined with sharply varying community referral practices, may often
result in commitment of one juvenile, but not another, although both
are apprehended for the same conduct.3 The potential for discrimina-
tory enforcement is patent.31
The Musser case also illustrates one final problem of vagueness in
juvenile detention statutes. In Musser, the Supreme Court remanded
to the state court for a determination of the meaning of the statute as
developed by judicial decisions.' However, there is a conspicuous
2 6 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
27 "Catchall" provisions which specify no particular criminal act make it virtually
impossible for defense counsel to argue that his client's conduct did not fall within
the broad perimeters of the statute. In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 404
(1966), the Court stated: "[Ilt would be difficult if not impossible for a person to
prepare a defense against such general abstract charges as 'misconduct,' or 'repre-
hensible conduct.'"
28 See P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 210 (1949); Tappan, Unofficial Delin-
quency, supra note 3, at 550. For example, a judge incensed by a teenager with
an illegitimate child could easily find statutory authorization under typical delinquency
provisions for committing the defendant to an institution. Young, Court-Ordered Con-
traception, 55 A.B.A.J. 223 (March, 1969). In a recent Connecticut case, commitment
proceedings under § 17-379 were begun on charges that an unwed, pregnant girl was
"in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice." Telephone conversation with Mr.
Joseph Harbaugh, Chief Public Defender for the State of Connecticut, Aug. 13, 1969.
29 TASK FORCE REPORT 25; see Tappan, Judicial and Administrative Approaches
to Children With Problems, in JUSTICE FOR THaE CHILD, supra note 4, at 144, 156-57.
3
D See F. SUSSMAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 23 (1950).
S See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
32333 U.S. at 97-98.
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absence of common law development for the typical juvenile delinquency
statute. This is due to the large number of unofficial adjudications,"3
the lack of public records and case reports in jurisdictions requiring
confidentiality, 4 and the dearth of juvenile court rulings challenged
at the appellate levelY3 Thus a typical delinquency statute, which is
vague on its face, cannot be saved by the clarifying gloss of accumulated
judicial interpretation, because generally there is none.3
Applying the principles in Musser, it is certain that the Connecticut
statute would be declared unconstitutionally vague. Thus the only
question remaining is identical to that resolved in Gault: whether it is
valid to deny juvenile defendants the rights of due process accorded to
adults.
The Connecticut court reasoned that since Miss Mattiello's pro-
ceedings were civil, and the purpose of the statute protective rather than
punitive, the vagueness principle was inapplicable.3 7  However, this is
precisely the same rationale rejected by Justice Fortas in Gault. The
Supreme Court clearly stated that state penal institutions are so lacking
in therapeutic value 3s and the consequences of conviction are so harsh
that this process cannot possibly be considered protective.3 9 The juve-
nile defendant has as much at stake in his hearing as the adult defendant
has at trial.
Other justifications for broad delinquency statutes, not mentioned
by the Connecticut court, also fail upon close examination. For ex-
ample, some experts maintain that broad statutes facilitate early inter-
vention, allowing the reformative influence of juvenile courts and train-
ing schools to reach the delinquent before he commits more serious
crimes.40  But this argument, too, relies on the premise that the process
33 P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DEiQTJENcY 183 (1949).
3 4 Text accompanying note 8 supra.
35 Elson, Juvenile Courts & Due Process, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD, supra
note 4, at 95, 98.
3 1See Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76,
87 (1966). The mounting attack on vague disorderly conduct and vagrancy statutes,
most of which are more tightly drawn than the delinquency provisions discussed here,
supports this conclusion. George, Gault: Notice and Fair Hearing, in GAULT: WHAT
Now FOR THE JUVENILE COURT 71, 80 (V. Nordin ed. 1968). See also Douglas,
Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960) ; Watts, Disorderly
Conduct Statutes In Our Changing Society, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 349 (1967).
37 State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 62, 225 A.2d 507, 511 (App. Div. 1966).
38 It should be noted that at the Connecticut State Farm for Women, Miss
Mattiello will be associating with persons convicted of felonies and misdemeanors
such as prostitution, intoxication, and drug use. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-360
(1958). Although girls committed pursuant to § 17-379 are segregated from the
felons, they participate in the same programs and receive only that rehabilitative
treatment afforded misdemeanants. F. LOVELAND, THE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
AND SERVICES OF CONNECTICUT 45-47 (1966). Though equipped with rehabilitative
facilities, the State Farm is still a penal institution. See United States ex rel. Robin-
son v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 14-15 (D. Conn. 1968).
39 Text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
40 Rosenheim, Perennial Problems in the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD, supra note 4, at 12.
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is rehabilitative&-a premise rejected in Gault.4 If communities actu-
ally provided the resources necessary for effective rehabilitative treat-
ment, the result might well be different. But early intervention and
confinement in existing institutions may actually help to fix delinquency
in a child, because he begins to think of himself as a delinquent and
structures his behavior accordingly. 2 Moreover, as Gault points out,
detention may leave a permanent blemish on the individual's record
which will continue its detrimental effect even if the institution should
succeed in its intention to reform the juvenile."
Furthermore, any attempt to deal with precriminal delinquency
may be limited by the inability of modem criminology to produce a
reliable method of predicting criminal conduct on the basis of juvenile
behavior.44  Professor Tappan argues:
The law may not [aside from such special situations as
attempts and conspiracy] impose anticipatory control upon the
individual who has not yet offended against it . ... It can-
not without grave injustices prevent the first offense through
efforts at personality diagnosis and treatment . . . Preven-
tive work may be done best by home, neighborhood, and
church, or in their failure by social agencies especially de-
signed for familial, financial, occupational, medical, psychi-
atric, and other therapy. Where all of these fail, as evidenced
by specific overt misconduct violative of the law, the courts
for delinquency must be resorted to for the special and in-
tensive therapy and retraining.43
This logic would prohibit entirely early intervention by the courts for
the purpose of preventive detention. However, whatever the merits of
this contention may be, it is certain that such intervention is worse
than useless when there is no substantial possibility of rehabilitation.
Broadly phrased delinquency statutes have also been defended on
grounds that the sound discretion of prosecutors and juvenile court
judges constitutes a sufficient safeguard against injustice. Professor
Monrad Paulsen earlier expressed such a view, but more recently he has
4 1 Text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
4 2 TASK FORCE REPORT 7-8; see Tappan, The Adolescent in Court, 37 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 216, 221 (1946-47).
4 3 Text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
44 TASK FORCE REPORT 8: Tappan, The Adolescent in Court, supra note 42, at 227.
Broad vagrancy statutes, like broad delinquency statutes, are defended on the
ground that since vagrancy is a preliminary stage of serious criminality, early inter-
vention is vital to community interests. However, there is no statistical correlation
between vagrancy and criminality significant enough to warrant such intervention
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 627
(1956).
45 Tappan, The Adolescent in; Court, supra note 42, at 227-28. Professor Tappan
further observes that "the expansive drive in some courts toward problem-solving for
all comers has resulted in attenuated, inexact, and ineffectual service." Id. 223.
[Vo1.118:143
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admitted skepticism about the ability of juvenile courts and understaffed
intake and referral agencies to enforce delinquency provisions in a dis-
criminating manner.46 Finally, as noted above,4" loosely framed de-
tention statutes encourage enforcement officers to adjudge delinquent
conduct which offends personal sensibilities. Such personal judgments
lead to discriminatory enforcement, rather than the uniform application
which the Constitution demands.
Finally, it might be questioned whether there are sufficient prose-
cutions under the vague clauses of delinquency statutes to warrant con-
cern. But according to national juvenile court records, children alleged
to have violated laws that apply only to juveniles, such as curfew regula-
tions, and children variously designated as "ungovernable," "incor-
rigible," or "in need of supervision" account for over twenty-five per
cent of the total number of juveniles brought before the courts, and for
twenty-five to thirty per cent of the population of state institutions for
delinquent children." During the period 1961-1967, 560 prosecutions
were brought under Connecticut's "manifest danger" statute; 256 of
these resulted in convictions. When Frances Mattiello was committed,
she joined 148 other girls in the Connecticut State Farm for Women
held for violations of section 17-739."9 Such figures indicate that
prosecutors use vague delinquency statutes to full advantage.
Indignation over the Supreme Court's failure to confront the grave
constitutional problems inherent in the Connecticut manifest danger
statute may be assuaged by reports of an informal agreement among
state prosecutors to discontinue its enforcement.,;' However, such
relief should be short-lived. First, an individual prosecutor, anxious
to establish a reputation for aggressive criminal law enforcement, may
well attempt to reactivate the statute. A prosecutor not party to the
gentlemen's agreement is all the more likely to do so. In addition, the
agreement provides no remedy to those juveniles who are victimized
by its breach.
Second, and most important, is the fact that the Connecticut statute
does not stand alone. In Alabama, for example, a minor who is "guilty
46 The earlier view was expressed in Paulsen, Fairness To The Juvenile Offender,
41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957). However, Professor Paulsen explained, this view was
based on an assumption that the treatment offered by the juvenile court was in fact
rehabilitative. His current position is set forth in Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect,
& Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THIE CHILD, supra
note 4, at 44, 53. Professors Paulsen and Tappan note that retribution has remained
an influential factor in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See id.; P. TAPPAN,
JUVENILE DELiNQUExcY 428 (1949).
47 Text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
48 TASK FORCE REPORT, 4.
49 Brief for Appellant at 21, Mattiello v. Connecticut, 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
50 Telephone conversation with Robert N. Grosby, attorney for Miss Mattiello,
Aug. 11, 1969. According to Joseph Harbaugh, Connecticut's Chief Public Defender
and co-counsel in Mattiello, the number of commitments for violation of § 17-379 has
fallen off sharply in recent months. Telephone conversation with Joseph Harbaugh,
Aug. 13, 1969.
The Connecticut legislature recently repealed Corn. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-219
(1958). TIm, Aug. 8, 1969 at 57.
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of immoral conduct" "' or who is "leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or
immoral life" 2 may be committed as a juvenile delinquent. In Florida,
"a child in need of supervision" is one who is "growing up in idleness
or crime." ' A Maine statute authorizes juvenile court jurisdiction
over minors "behaving in an incorrigible or indecent and lascivious
manner" or "living in circumstances of manifest danger of falling into
habits of vice or immorality." " In what is perhaps the least helpful of
these definitions, New Jersey tautologically defines delinquency as "in-
corrigibility," "immorality," or "growing up in idleness or delin-
quency." 0 The national scope of the problem makes even more repre-
hensible the failure of the Supreme Court to decide this question.5"
CONCLUSION
Vague delinquency provisions based on subjective determinations
of "immorality" and unsupported predictions of future criminal con-
duct have no legal or practical justification. The due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires that state statutes provide fair
warning of proscribed conduct and fixed guidelines for judicial enforce-
ment. Many delinquency provisions fail to meet this requirement. The
dismal prospects for rehabilitation through institutionalization discredit
the claimed efficacy of early intervention facilitated by such statutes.'
Although the subject of juvenile delinquency admittedly does not
lend itself to sharply circumscribed definition, more precise statutes are
legislatively possible. Provisions permitting courts to make judgments
based on moral or social philosophies should be deleted. The legal
definition of delinquency should be based on the commission of definite
statutory offenses or on an habitual course of conduct demonstrably
harmful to the juvenile or the community."' A Minnesota statute repre-
sents a reasonable legislative approach. 5 Delinquency is defined as the
5 1 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1958).
52 Id.
u
3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(12) (a) (Supp. 1969).
54 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2552 (1964)
55 N.J. REv. STAT. §2A:4-14(f), (g), (i) (1969).
6 The examples cited represent only the most offensive provisions of state de-
linquency statutes. Such statutes also define delinquency by reference to violation
of penal code provisions, habitual truancy, and other more objectively defined criteria.
However, the presence of such "catchall" provisions eliminates the need for the prose-
cutor to prove violations of more specific provisions. For statutory language similar
to that cited in the text, see IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3204(16) (Supp. 1967); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 119, §52 (1965); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §712 A2(a) (3), (5) (1968);
NEv. REv. STAT. §201.090(12), (13) (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §27-16-08(1)(c)
(1960); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. §14-1-3(G)(3) (1956); WAsH. REv. CODE AxN.
§ 13.04.010(8) (1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-41(1) (1957).
0 One authority contends that except where there has been a showing of special
appropriateness or an utter absence of alternatives, a child committed for noncriminal
behavior should never be sent to an institution for delinquents. Sheridan, Juveniles
Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional System? 31 FED. PRO-
BATION 26-30 (March, 1967).58 See P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 247 (1949).
59 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (Supp. 1969).
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violation of state or federal laws or municipal ordinances, habitual
truancy, habitual disobedience resulting in lack of parental control, or
habitual deportment in a dangerous or injurious manner. Although
the statute is not perfect, the elements which are based upon the com-
mission of definite statutory offenses or habitual courses of conduct
provide adequate warning of proscribed conduct and sufficient guide-
lines for the exercise of the judicial function. If such provisions con-
stituted the basis of delinquency jurisdiction, the potential for judicial
abuse, popular uncertainty, and uneven application would be substan-
tially reduced."
The Gault decision appeared to mark the beginning of a sensitive
response by the Supreme Court to the unrealistic theories underlying
juvenile court systems. Unfortunately the Court's action in Mattiello
has done much to undercut the expectations of meaningful developments
in juvenile law fostered by Gault. Procedural safeguards will mean
little to youthful defendants who must face the uncertainties of the
typical delinquency statutes.
GO For the suggestion that serious consideration be given to the complete elimina-
tion of court jurisdiction over conduct illegal only for a child, see TASK FORCE
REroRT, 27.
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